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Every decade or so, food becomes newsworthy globally because of a price spike, either upwards 
(hurting consumers, as in 1973 and 2008) or downwards (hurting farmers in open economies, as 
in 1986). Most such price spikes are a consequence of major policy shifts, since local weather-
induced supply shocks in a multi-country trading world tend to offset each other. Fluctuations in 
international food prices are exacerbated by trade restrictions that vary with those prices, and are 
worst for the most-insulated markets such as rice. Asian rice policies thus contribute to world 
food price instability. More broadly, however, the gradual reduction in anti-agricultural and anti-
trade policies in many Asian emerging economies in the past quarter-century has contributed 
very substantially to global economic development and poverty alleviation. After examining how 
large the fluctuations in real international prices for food are relative to those for other primary 
products, this paper examines the extent of opening up of agricultural markets in Asia relative to 
other developing economies. It then examines what could be done by governments in Asia and 
elsewhere to achieve more efficient and equitable outcomes for food markets in the future that 
are both growth enhancing and poverty alleviating. 
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With food, petroleum and other primary product prices rising rapidly in 2007-08 in response 
to high growth in Asia’s large emerging economies, and then the world economy suddenly 
slowing down in the 4
th quarter of 2008 and much of it heading into recession, it is very 
appropriate that ADBI annual conference is examining Asia’s contributions to global 
economic development and stability. My assigned role is to focus on the region’s 
contributions via policies affecting the agricultural sector, and in particular on the role of 
Asian governments in stabilizing prices of food and other agricultural products. 
  Food price gyrations worry the poor even in high-income countries, but they are 
especially important in low-income countries where poorer households spend most of their 
income on food. Upward spikes hurt buyers of food, but equally downward spikes in the 
prices of farm products can harm a large proportion of households in developing countries for 
which agriculture is a major source of employment and GDP. Hence national policies that 
reduce the amplitude of domestic agricultural price fluctuations over time help either 
domestic consumers at the expense of the country’s farm households, or vice versa.  
The policy instruments used for that purpose typically are the same ones that are used 
to alter the trend level of domestic agricultural prices, namely trade policy measures.
1 When 
many national governments intervene with variable trade taxes or quantitative restrictions, the 
share of global production that is traded shrinks, making the international market thinner than 
it otherwise would be. This erodes the international public good that open national economies 
generate for each other through trade, not only because the normal economic gains from trade 
are diminished but also because an international market that is thinner for this reason is 
                                                 
1 Sometimes these are supplemented with government storage initiatives, but those are commonly ineffective or 
excessively expensive and so tend to be short-lived. Managing public food stockholding is difficult because of 
uncertainty about the quantity of stocks required and the amount to release at any point in time. Stock 
mismanagement can even be destabilizing, as sometimes appears to have been the case in 2008, with attempts to 
create or expand stocks when food prices were at their peak. Stocks are a large drain on the treasury, particularly 
when displacement of private stocks is taken into account. Their interaction with trade policies needs to be 
carefully considered too. If, for instance, farm output falls for a product protected only by an import tariff, sales 
from stocks will reduce imports but do nothing for the farmers whose output has fallen.   2
necessarily going to be more volatile. That greater volatility entices even more governments 
to intervene to stabilize their domestic food market, raising international price volatility 
further. This is especially bad for the development of open agricultural-exporting economies, 
since history has shown that volatility in a country’s long-run trend terms of trade slows its 
economic growth (Williamson 2008). That beggar-thy-neighbor unilateral policy action 
generates an international public ‘bad’, suggesting there is scope for collaborative action. 
  How large are fluctuations in real international prices for food, both absolutely and 
relative to those for other primary products, and how does the price spike in 2008 compare 
with earlier spikes? How much has agriculture lagged behind other sectors in expanding the 
extent to which its products are traded internationally in the latest wave of globalization, and 
how does Asia compare with other regions in this respect? What impacts have government 
policies had on farmer incentives, in Asia as compared with elsewhere, in terms of both long-
term trends and fluctuations from year to year? This paper addresses each of these questions 
in turn, and then examines what could be done by governments in Asia and elsewhere, both 
unilaterally and collaboratively, to achieve more efficient and equitable outcomes in the 
future that are stabilizing, growth enhancing and poverty alleviating. 
 
 
The 2008 commodity price hike in historical perspective 
  
 
The international price of rice nearly trebled in the first few months of 2008, sending 
politicians, bureaucrats and consumers into panic. Some governments responded with 
restrictions on their exports of rice, which exacerbated the situation for rice-importing 
countries. Prices of other grains and oilseeds also rose rapidly, though none as much as for 
rice. As a result, the World Bank’s food price index in the second quarter of 2008 was 55 
percent above its 2007 level in nominal US dollar terms. Figure 1 shows the quarterly grain 
prices for the decade to mid-2008. In the second half of 2008, however, they – and most other 
primary commodity prices – have roughly halved, again in nominal US dollars. 
 
Drivers of the recent food price rise 
 
Causes of this latest food price spike have been much debated (IFPRI 2007; Mitchell 2008; 
OECD and FAO 2008; Stoeckel 2008; Meyers and Meyer 2008). On the supply side, grain   3
reserves had been run down over the first half of this decade in response to low prices so that, 
when there were crop failures in some grain-exporting countries in 2006-07, it was a matter 
of having to wait for the next harvest before supplies could be replenished.
2 Meanwhile, the 
steady rise in petroleum prices – due in large part to the rapid growth of Asia’s emerging 
economies – and hence also in urea fertilizer prices (Figure 2) added substantially to farmer 
costs, which dampened their incentives to expand output.  
On the demand side, two sets of changes coincided. One was the impact of rapid 
income growth in Asia on the demand for high-protein foods including meat and milk, which 
was driving up not only their prices but also the prices of feedgrains and oilseeds.
3 The other 
was an unanticipated government response to rising petroleum prices and concerns about 
carbon emissions by both the United States and the European Union, namely, the imposition 
of policies to subsidize domestic biofuel production through tax credits and to introduce 
mandates on biofuel use. Those actions led to sudden increases in the demand for maize in 
the US and for rapeseed in the EU. The supply response by farmers there was to move into 
growing those crops at the expense of others, thereby adding to the shortage of grains and 
oilseeds for satisfying food and animal feed demand (OECD 2008c). The weakening value of 
the US dollar against the Euro and other currencies also contributed to the rise in the nominal 
US$ price of commodities. Also, there was an increase in speculative holdings of 
commodities because the excess demand for assets from emerging economies (whose own 
financial sectors are underdeveloped) could not be met by financial assets in the US in the 12 
months to mid-2008 (Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas 2008; Just and Just 2008). That excess 
demand had driven down US interest rates, making it less unprofitable to hold commodities 
(Frankel 2008). And panic buying and hoarding by Asian rice consumers added to the 
magnitude of the rice price spikes in the second quarter of 2008. 
  A consensus on the relative contributions to the food price hike of these various 
factors – and of the food export restrictions by numerous food-surplus developing countries 
during 2008 – is yet to emerge (Heady and Fan 2008). According to Mitchell (2008), higher 
energy prices and the related increase in farm production costs, together with the weakening 
of the US dollar, may have contributed about one-quarter of the rise in food prices between 
2002 and early 2008, and biofuel subsidies (itself partly a response to high petroleum prices 
and growing concerns for greater energy security) may be responsible for much of the rest. In 
                                                 
2 In 2006 global grain reserves were less than one-quarter of annual consumption, compared with more than 
one-third during 1997-2001 (Stoeckel 2008, Figure 12, based on OECD and FAO data). By 2007-08 they were 
only one-sixth (Meyers and Meyer 2008). 
3 China’s volume of oilseed use doubled in the decade to 2007-08 (Meyers and Meyer 2008).   4
the case of rice, export restrictions are reported to have caused its price to have risen by as 
much as one-quarter (Meyers and Meyer 2008). 
Mitchell’s analysis would imply that the dramatic fall – by more than two-thirds – in 
the US dollar price of a barrel of oil in the 4 months to early December 2008 would be a 
contributor to the halving in the prices of numerous agricultural products over that period, as 
would the easing/removal of temporary food export restrictions. But whether those food 
prices will return to and remain at the relatively low levels of early this decade depends 
heavily on whether biofuel tax credits and mandates persist in the US and EU. Projections 
published before mid-2008 by IFPRI (2007) suggest real international food prices by 2050 
would be 30-80 percent higher than in 1999-2001 unless farm productivity growth is 
accelerated substantially. The OECD and FAO (2008) projections are not quite as dramatic, 
but they suggest nominal food prices will rise and real ones will fall much less than in 
previous decades. These agencies stress, though, that these price projections would be much 
less positive if biofuel subsidies (via tax credits) and mandates were reduced or abandoned 
(see OECD 2008c; FAO 2008).   
 
Relative magnitude of the recent food price rise 
 
Large and sudden as this latest food price shock has been, it is not unprecedented. Using as a 
deflator the price of manufactured exports to developing countries from the largest five high-
income countries, the World Bank has compiled an index of real international prices of food 
products important for developing countries since 1900 (Grilli and Yang 1988, updated by 
Pfaffenzeller, Newbolt and Rayner 2007). Over the 20
th century that real food price index fell 
at 0.75 percent per year. Most of the decline was in the second half of the century though, and 
for the 60 years since 1948 the annual rate of decline was twice as rapid, at 1.5 percent. 
During that post-World War II period the index spiked above trend six times, or an average 
of once per decade. It is clear from Figure 3 that the 1973-74 spike was much larger than the 
estimate depicted there for 2008, but none of the other price rises was as big as that in 2008, 
especially in proportional terms. The 1973-74 event was partly associated with the four-fold 
rise in the price of oil when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
unilaterally imposed production quotas, but mostly was due to the Soviet Union departing 
from its policy of self-reliance and entering the international grain market in a significant and 
unanticipated way to offset a domestic shortfall (Johnson 1975; Morgan 1979, Ch. 1).    5
  The other point to note from Figure 3 is that, in each of the six previous cases, the 
price rise is followed very shortly after by an equally sharp fall. So the food price fall in the 
second half of 2008 also is not unprecedented, although its suddenness and severity may have 
been exacerbated by the cessation of economic growth brought on by the global financial 
crisis of 2008. 
In Figure 4 the annual movements in food prices since 1960 are shown alongside 
those for energy, minerals and metals, and other primary products, all of them deflated by the 
same price index for manufactures. The energy price rises since the early 1970s have been 
driven largely by the OPEC cartel’s production quotas not expanding as fast as quantities 
demanded globally. The minerals and metals fluctuations are driven mostly from the demand 
side by the global business cycle, as is the price of timber which has a 44 percent weight in 
the index for other primary products (the rest being non-food agricultural and so also subject 
to farm policy interventions).  
It is conceivable that weather-related supply shocks could contribute to fluctuations in 
food and other agricultural prices, but the vast differences in unseasonable weather around 
the world mean its influence on international prices would be very minor if each national 
market was fully integrated with the rest of the world. Indeed Johnson (1975) estimated that, 
had free trade in grain been in place in the mid-1970s, prices would have been so much less 
variable – because trade would mitigate local supply variability – that only negligible 
quantities of carryover/storage would have been profitable. A subsequent study of global 
food trade provided complementary results: using a stochastic model of world markets for 
grains, livestock products and sugar, Tyers and Anderson (1992, Table 6.14) found that 
instability of international food prices in the early 1980s was three times greater than it would 
have been under free trade in those products. This suggests that the relatively high volatility 
in international food markets is caused by the thinness of that market, which in turn is due to 
the use of variable trade policy instruments to insulate domestic food markets from 
fluctuations abroad.  
Market thinness is also linked to another common characteristic of agricultural trade 
policies, which has to do with the way they are used to alter the trend level of domestic prices 
of farm products: should they have an anti-trade bias, that too will make the international 
market ‘thinner’ and hence more volatile. As we will see below, governments do indeed tend 
to keep domestic prices below (above) the trend level in the international market the stronger 
the country’s agricultural comparative advantage (disadvantage) and, within the farm sector,   6
to bias assistance towards import-competing farm industries at the expense of export 
industries. 
Before turning to recent evidence of the within- and  between-country anti-trade bias 
in government intervention in agricultural markets, it is helpful first to review trends in the 
international tradability of agricultural versus other products. 
 
 
Trends in tradability of agricultural products 
 
 
Globalization forces have lowered hugely the cost of doing business across national borders. 
During the past quarter century they have included the information and communications 
technology revolutions, as well as technical changes in transport such as bulk carriers and the 
containerization of ocean shipping. Policy changes such as the deregulation of airline and 
other services and the phasing down of manufacturing tariffs also have lowered trade costs 
hugely, including through allowing ever-greater fragmentation of production of goods and 
services and out-sourcing abroad. As a result, international trade has expanded much faster 
than global production. Between 1974 and 2007, real GDP grew at 2.9 percent while the real 
value of international trade grew at 5.0 percent (WTO 2008). 
  In agriculture, by contrast, there has been relatively little growth in the propensity to 
trade. For developing countries the share of farm production traded has remained around 8 
percent since the early 1960s, and for high-income countries it has grown mainly within the 
European Union and within NAFTA. Even including that intra-bloc trade, the share of farm 
production exported globally has risen only modestly over the past five decades, from 11 to 
16 percent, and has remained around 4 or 5 percent in Asia (Table 1).  
Certainly it is more difficult to break up the production process into component parts 
in agriculture than it is in manufacturing, but that is likely to be only a small part of the 
explanation for the relatively low farm trade growth experience. A more likely explanation is 
the persistence of government intervention in agricultural markets, especially if such 
intervention includes an insulating component and an anti-trade bias. To explore that 
possibility, the next section summarizes the findings of a new set of estimates of distortions 
to agricultural incentives over the past half-century. 
 
   7
Estimates of distortions to agricultural incentives  
 
 
A study two decades ago showed that developing economies had been taxing heavily their 
agricultural sectors, both directly and indirectly via protecting manufacturing from import 
competition and overvalued exchange rates (Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 1988, 1991). The 
main exceptions seemed to be South Korea and Taiwan which, like Japan some decades 
earlier, had switched from taxing to assisting their farmers and were steadily raising that 
assistance as their per capita income and agricultural comparative disadvantage rose in the 
course of their rapid economic growth (Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986). But since the 
mid-1980s, great progress has been made by many developing countries in reducing their 
earlier anti-farm policy bias, and indeed these changes have been transformational in China 
and to a lesser extent in India.  
To better understand the nature and extent of this reform process, a new World Bank 
research project has revisited this issue, extending those earlier estimates of distortions to the 
present decade and expanding the sample to examine similar trends in other parts of Asia as 
well as in Africa, the Americas and Europe. In all, estimates are now available for 75 
countries comprising 90 percent of global agriculture (and 95 percent of Asia’s economy), 
and for as many years as possible over the past five decades (Anderson and Valenzuela 
2008). 
A key driver of the rapid growth and industrialization of Asia has been the decision 
by many countries of the region to become more open and switch away from an import-
substituting development strategy to one that is export oriented. With that export-led growth 
has come dramatic restructuring of Asia’s economies away from agriculture and towards not 
only manufacturing but also service activities. For developing Asia as a whole, agriculture is 
now less than one-eighth of GDP (down from more than one-third in the late 1960s), industry 
has risen from 27 to 38 percent, and services from 35 to 49 percent. The apparent decline in 
agricultural comparative advantage in developing Asia is evident in the self-sufficiency data 
for primary farm products. Until 30 years ago the region was almost exactly 100 percent self-
sufficient in farm products, but since then that indicator has declined to less than 85 percent. 
The share of farm production exported has not changed much, averaging in the 4-6 percent 
range (although there have been substantial changes in individual countries, with declines in 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Taiwan offset by increases in countries such as   8
Vietnam, Thailand and China). By contrast, since the latter 1970s the share of imports in 
domestic consumption of farm products has quadrupled, to around 20 percent (Table 1).  
The increasing dependence on imports of farm products in Asia has occurred despite 
reductions in the taxation of agricultural exports and increases in incentives provided to 
farmers via government policy reforms. Before presenting those results, it is necessary to 
briefly summarize the methodology used to generate these new indicators of distortions 
(details of which are available in Anderson et al. 2008). 
    
Methodology for measuring price distortions 
 
The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) is the key indicator used. It is defined as the percentage 
by which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be 
without the government’s intervention (or lowered them, if NRA<0).
4 If a trade measure is 
the sole source of government intervention, then the measured NRA will also be the 
consumer tax equivalent (CTE) rate at that same point in the value chain. But where there are 
also domestic producer or consumer taxes or subsidies, the NRA and CTE will no longer be 
equal and at least one of them will be different from the price distortion at the border due to 
trade measures. Both are expressed as a percentage of the undistorted price (unlike the 
producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) computed by OECD (2008a) 
which are expressed as a percentage of the distorted price).  
Each industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of exportables, 
or as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over the years), so as to 
generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of tradables. 
Those NRAs are used to generate a trade bias index, TBI, defined as: 
(1)    TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1 
where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and 
exportables parts of the agricultural sector. The TBI indicates in a single number the extent to 
which the typically anti-trade bias (negative TBI) in agricultural policies changes over time.  
The coverage of products for NRA estimates averages between two-thirds and three-
quarters of the gross value of Asian farm production at undistorted prices. Authors of the 
                                                 
4 In most countries distortions to farm inputs are very small compared with distortions to farm output prices. But 
where there are significant product-specific distortions to input costs, they are captured by estimating their 
equivalence in terms of a higher output price and including that in the NRA for individual agricultural industries 
wherever data allow. Any non-product-specific distortions, including distortions to farm input prices, are also 
added into the estimate for the overall sectoral NRA for agriculture as a whole.   9
country case studies also provide ‘guesstimates’ of the NRAs for non-covered farm products. 
Weighted averages for all agricultural products are then generated, using the gross values of 
production at unassisted prices as weights. For countries that also provide non-product-
specific agricultural subsidies or taxes (assumed to be shared on a pro-rata basis between 
tradables and nontradables), such net assistance is then added to product-specific assistance 
to get a NRA for total agriculture (and also for tradable agricultural products).  
Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own outputs but also by the incentives 
nonagricultural producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of 
government assistance that affect producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner 
(1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved that in a two-sector economy, an import 
tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model that also includes a third 
sector producing only nontradables, to a model with imperfect competition, and regardless of 
the economy’s size (Vousden 1990, pp. 46-47). If one assumes that there are no distortions in 
the markets for nontradables and that the value shares of agricultural and non-agricultural 
nontradable products remain constant, then the economy-wide effect of distortions to 
agricultural incentives can be captured by the extent to which the tradable parts of 
agricultural production are assisted or taxed relative to producers of non-farm tradables. By 
generating estimates of the average NRA for non-agricultural tradables, it is then possible to 
calculate a Relative Rate of Assistance, RRA, defined in percentage terms as: 
(2)    RRA = 100[(1+NRAag
t/100)/(1+NRAnonag
t/100) – 1] 
where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the weighted average percentage NRAs for the tradable 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. Since the NRA cannot be 
less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA (assuming 
NRAnonag
t is positive). And if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. 
This measure is useful in that if it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally 
comparable indication of the extent to which a country’s policy regime has an anti- (pro-) 
agricultural bias. 
In calculating the NRA for producers of agricultural and non-agricultural tradables, 
the methodology sought to include distortions generated by dual or multiple exchange rates. 
Such direct interventions in the market for foreign currency were common in some Asian 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s, including China. However, authors of some of the focus 
country studies had difficulty finding an appropriate estimate of the extent of that distortion, 
so the impact of that on NRAs has not been included for all. Its exclusion for some countries 
(e.g., India) means their estimated (typically) positive NRAs for importables and (typically)   10
negative NRAs for exportables are smaller than they should be. It would also lead to an 
underestimation of the (anti-)trade bias index. And in cases where the NRA for importables 
dominates that for exportables, this omission would lead to an underestimate of the average 
(positive) NRA for such tradables sectors, and conversely.  
The NRAs and CTEs are usable as distortion measures in national or global economy-
wide CGE models to estimate the trade, economic welfare and other effects of government 
interventions. They are not ideal as trade or welfare indicators on their own though, because 
of possible offsets. For example, suppose a country has positive NRAs for its import-
competing farm industries but negative NRAs for its export industries. The weighted average 
NRA for the sector might be close to zero, whereas trade and welfare effects of those two 
sub-sectors’ distortions are additive. That is, their total effect on trade or welfare is greater 
than the two individual sets of effects, not less than as implied when one averages their 
NRAs. The same is true when averaging NRAs across countries when some countries have 
positive average NRAs and others negative averages. To overcome this averaging problem, 
Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2008) devise more-satisfactory indexes for capturing distortions 
to agricultural incentives, drawing on the trade restrictiveness index literature developed by 
Anderson and Neary (summarized in and extended beyond their 2005 book) and the 
theoretical simplifications by Feenstra (1995) and Lloyd (2007, 2008).  
Specifically, to capture distortions imposed by each country’s border and domestic 
policies on its economic welfare and its trade volume, Lloyd, Croser and Anderson define 
measures they call the Welfare Reduction Index (WRI) and the Trade Reduction Index (TRI). 
The WRI (or TRI) has the advantage of providing a theoretically sound indicator of the 
welfare (or trade) effect in a single sectoral measure that is comparable across time and place. 
That measure estimates the common trade tax across all agricultural products that would 
generate the same welfare cost (or same reduction in trade) as that generated by the actual 
structure of NRAs and CTEs in a country. In this way the WRI and TRI go somewhat closer 
to what a computable general equilibrium (CGE) can provide in the way of estimates of the 
trade and welfare (and other) effects of the price distortions captured by the product NRA and 
CTE estimates – and have the advantage of being able to indicate trends over time. 
 
Estimates of NRAs, RRAs, CTEs, WRIs and TRIs 
   11
We begin with estimates of the nominal rates of assistance to agriculture, then compare them 
with the nominal rates for non-agricultural tradables in Asia and with similar rates for other 
regions, and then provide estimates of the Welfare Reduction Index and the Trade Reduction 
Index, again reporting those for other regions as comparators.  
 
a. Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture 
From the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, agricultural price and trade policies reduced earnings 
of farmers in developing Asia, on average by more than 20 percent; but that implicit taxation 
declined from the early 1980s and, from the mid-1990s, the NRA switched sign and became 
increasingly positive. That average hides considerable diversity within the region, however. 
Nominal assistance to farmers in Korea and Taiwan was positive from the early 1960s 
(although very small initially when compared with the 40+ percent in Japan at that time), 
Indonesia had some years in the 1970s and 1980s when its NRA was a little above zero (as 
did Pakistan prior to Bangladesh becoming an independent country in 1971), and India’s and 
the Philippines’ average NRAs became positive from the 1980s (Table 2).
5  
This trend is present for the vast majority of the commodity NRAs for the region too, 
with meat and milk the only products to have seen their assistance rates cut over that period. 
As is true for other regions of the world, assistance is among the highest for the ‘rice 
pudding’ products of sugar, milk and rice (Anderson 2008, Table 6). But even for those three 
products there is a great diversity across countries in their NRAs, with 5-year averages 
ranging from almost zero to as much as 400 percent for rice and 140 percent for milk in 
Korea, and to 230 percent for sugar in Bangladesh. There is a great deal of NRA diversity 
also across commodities within each Asian economy’s farm sector, and the extent (as 
measured by the standard deviation) has grown rather that diminished over the past five 
decades, from a regional average of less than 40 percent in the early years under study to 
more than 55 percent in recent years. This suggests there is still much that could be gained 
from improved resource reallocation both between Asian economies and within the 
agricultural sector of individual Asian economies, were differences in rates of assistance to be 
reduced. 
                                                 
5 Note that in the tables and figures to follow, it has been assumed that NRAs for China pre-1981 and India pre-
1965 are the same as the average NRA estimates for those economies for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, 
and that the gross value of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share of value 
of production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. This NRA assumption is 
conservative in the sense that for both countries the average NRA was probably even lower (more negative) in 
earlier years.   12
  A striking feature of the distortion pattern within the farm sector is its strong anti-
trade bias. This is evident in Figure 5, which depicts the average NRAs for agriculture’s 
import-competing and export sub-sectors for the region: the former average is always positive 
and its trend is upward-sloping, whereas the NRA average for exportables is negative and did 
not diminish until the 1980s, after which it gradually approached zero. The gap between the 
NRAs for those two sub-sectors has diminished somewhat since the 1980s for the region as a 
whole, with several countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) contributing to that 
trend.  
 
b. Assistance to non-farm sectors and relative rates of assistance 
The anti-agricultural policy biases of the past were due not just to agricultural policies. Also 
important to changes in incentives affecting inter-sectorally mobile resources have been the 
significant reductions in border protection to the manufacturing sector (which has been the 
dominant intervention in the tradables part of non-agricultural sectors). That reduction in 
assistance to producers of non-farm tradables has been even more responsible for the 
improvement in farmer incentives than the reduction in direct taxation of agricultural 
industries. 
  It has not been possible to quantifying the distortions to non-farm tradable sectors as 
carefully as for agriculture. Authors of the country case studies typically relied on applied 
trade taxes (for exports as well as imports) rather than being able to undertake price 
comparisons, and hence they usually do not capture the quantitative restrictions on trade 
which were important in earlier decades but decreasingly so through recent times. Nor do 
they capture distortions in the services sectors, some of which now produce tradables (or 
would do in the absence of interventions preventing their emergence). As a result the 
estimated NRAs for non-farm importables are smaller and decline less rapidly than in fact 
was the case – and likewise for non-farm exportables, except their NRAs in some cases 
would have been negative, bearing in mind the anti-trade bias in the dual exchange rate 
systems that operated in China and elsewhere. Of those two elements of under-estimation, the 
former bias certainly dominates, so the authors’ estimates of the overall NRA for non-
agricultural tradables should be considered lower-bound estimates, and more so in the past so 
that its decline is less rapid than it should be.  
Despite that likely underestimation, the NRA estimates for non-farm tradables are 
very sizeable prior to the 1990s. For Asia as a whole, the average NRA value has steadily 
declined throughout the past four or five decades as policy reforms have spread. This has   13
therefore contributed to a decline in the estimated negative relative rate of assistance for 
farmers: the weighted average RRA was worse than -50 percent up to the early 1970s but 
improved to an average of -32 percent in the 1980s, -9 percent in the 1990s and is now 
positive, averaging 7 percent in 2000-04. The five-decade trends in RRAs and their two 
component NRAs for each economy are reported in Table 3. It is even clearer from Figure 6 
that the falling positive NRAs for non-farm producers has contributed even more to the rise 
of the RRA in Asia than has the gradual reduction in the negative NRAs for farmers due to 
agricultural policy reforms.  
Has the international location of production of farm products within Asia become 
more or less efficient as a result of policy changes over the past five decades? A global 
computable general equilibrium model with a time series of databases is needed to answer 
that question well. But one crude way of addressing the question is to examine the standard 
deviation of RRAs across the economies of the region over time. That indicator suggests 
distortions have become more dispersed across countries over time: it averaged 35 percent 
during 1960-74, 50 percent during 1975-89 and 55 percent during 1990-2004 (final row of 
Table 3). 
Of the striking changes in RRAs shown for individual economies over the past two 
decades, it is the move from negative to positive RRAs for China and India that matter most 
for the region – and indeed for the world. The extent of the decline in the non-agricultural 
NRA since the early 1980s is very similar for those two key countries, but the agricultural 
NRA has differed: in China the 5-year averages have risen steadily from -45 percent to 6 
percent, whereas in India it has been close to zero except for a spike upward when 
international food prices collapsed in the mid-1980s, and for a rise in the present decade 
(Figure 7).  
This dramatic rise in the RRA for the world’s two most populous countries is of great 
significance to understanding the causes of the international food price rises of the present 
decade. One of the contributors is said to be the growing appetite for food imports by these 
two countries as they industrialize and their per capita incomes rise. Yet as Table 1 shows, 
both countries have remained very close to self sufficient in agricultural products over the 
past four decades. Undoubtedly the steady rise in their RRAs has contributed to that outcome. 
It may also have helped ensure that the trend in China’s ratio of urban to rural mean incomes 
(adjusted for cost of living differences) has been flat since 1980 (Ravallion and Chen 2007, 
Figure 3), and that the Gini coefficient for India hardly changed between 1984 and 2004 
(World Bank 2008). A major question, to which we return at the end of the paper, is: will   14
their RRAs remain at their current neutral level of close to zero, or will they continue to rise 
in the same way as observed in Korea and Taiwan and, before them, in Japan?  
 
c. Comparisons with other regions’ assistance rates 
The regional upward shifts in agricultural NRAs and the RRAs towards zero, and even the 
move to positive agricultural NRAs and RRAs recently, are not unique to Asia. Figure 8 
shows that similar trends, albeit less steep, have resulted from policy reforms in other 
developing country regions over the past four decades, suggesting that similar political 
economy trends might be at work as economies develop. In the past it has been found that 
agricultural NRAs and RRAs are positively correlated with per capita income and agricultural 
comparative disadvantage (Anderson 1994, 1995). A glance at previous tables suggests that 
Asian economies have been – and continue to be – contributors to that trend. This is 
confirmed statistically in the multiple regressions with country and time fixed effects shown 
in Table 4. 
 
d. Consumer tax equivalents of agricultural policies 
If there were no farm input distortions and no domestic output price distortions so that the 
NRA was entirely the result of border measures such as an import or export tax or restriction, 
and there were no domestic consumption taxes or subsidies in place, then the CTE at the farm 
level would equal the NRA for each product. But such domestic distortions are present in 
several Asian economies. In Korea, for example, producer prices have been well above 
consumer prices for several important crop products, while in China the opposite was true at 
least until the early 1990s: producers of food staples were taxed more than consumers were 
subsidized, even taking into account the ‘iron rice bowl’ in-kind partial wage payment 
received by many urban workers. Also, because of international trade, the weights used to 
aggregate product distortion rates on the consumption side differ from those on the 
production side of the market. Hence the aggregate CTE differs somewhat from the aggregate 
NRA for each economy. 
 
  e. Welfare and Trade Reduction Indexes  
Table 3 reports the WRIs for agricultural import-competing products, exportables, all covered 
tradable products and all covered products from 1960 to 2007 for Asia and four other regions   15
and for the world as a whole.
6 The WRI results for covered products show a similar pattern 
over the five regions: there is a constant or increasing tendency for policies to reduce welfare 
from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, but thereafter the opposite occurs in almost all regions, as 
can be seen from Figure 9. This pattern is generated by different policy regimes in different 
regions. In high-income countries, agriculture was assisted throughout the period, although it 
peaked in the 1980s (at around 60 percent) and thereafter fell. By contrast, in developing 
countries, agriculture was disprotected until the mid-1980s, and only thereafter did taxation 
of developing country farmers decline to the point that they received positive assistance by 
the turn of the century. The WRI thus has the desirable property of correctly identifying the 
adverse welfare consequences that result from both positive and negative assistance regimes 
for the sector.  
  Turning to the trade restrictiveness of agricultural policy, for developing countries as 
a group the TRI was roughly constant or slightly rising until the early 1990s and thereafter it 
declined, especially for Asia and Latin America, according to the TRI estimates shown in 
Figure 10 and Table 6. For high-income countries the TRI time path was similar but the 
decline began a few years later. The aggregate results for developing countries are being 
driven by the exportables sub-sector which is being taxed and the import-competing sub-
sector which is being protected. Like the WRI, the TRI correctly aggregates the 
restrictiveness of sub-sector policies that are masked in aggregate NRA and CTE measures 
where they offset one another.  
The TRI generally shows greater variance than the WRI series. This is because the 
TRI measure is sensitive to switches from negative to positive rates of assistance. For 
example, a move from -30 to +30 percent rates of assistance would have little or no effect on 
the welfare consequences of the policy, but it could have a significant effect on trade 
restrictiveness: net imports of farm products would be greater when the NRA is negative than 
when it is positive, other things equal. The greater variability of the TRI is most clearly 
demonstrated for Asia in the period from 1965-69 to 1985-89: the WRI measure barely 
changed throughout that period whereas the TRI dipped down and then spiked upwards in the 
1980s (c.f. Figures 9 and 10).  
The fact that NRAs for high-income and developing countries diverged (in opposite 
ways) away from zero in the first half of the period under study and then converged toward 
                                                 
6 National WRIs are aggregated across countries using an average of the value of consumption and production at 
undistorted prices. National TRIs are aggregated across countries using the absolute difference between the 
value of production and the value of consumption at undistorted prices. National and regional indexes for the 5-
year periods are unweighted averages of the annual indexes.   16
zero in the most recent quarter-century meant that their weighted average NRA traced out a 
fairly flat trend. By contrast, Figure 11 shows the WRI and TRI for the world as a whole 
tracing out a hill-shaped path and thus providing less misleading indicators of the evolving 
disarray in world agricultural markets. Figure 11 also suggests that the global welfare cost of 
distortions was much higher than the NRA indicates but more so in earlier decades than in the 
current one. 
 
f. Welfare and trade effects according to a global economy-wide model 
It is clear from the above that there has been a great deal of change over the past quarter of a 
century in policy distortions to agricultural incentives in Asia and throughout the world, with 
the anti-agricultural and anti-trade biases of policies of many developing countries being 
reduced. As well, export subsidies of high-income countries have been cut, and some re-
instrumentation toward less inefficient and less trade-distorting forms of support, particularly 
in Western Europe, has begun. However, protection from agricultural import competition has 
continued to be on an upward trend in both rich and poor countries, notwithstanding the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture that aimed to bind and reduce farm tariffs. What, 
then, have been the net economic effects of agricultural price and trade policy changes 
around the world since the early 1980s? And how do those effects on global markets, farm 
incomes and economic welfare compare with the effects of policy distortions still in place as 
of 2004?  
Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009) use a global economy-wide 
model to provide a combined retrospective and prospective analysis that seeks to assess how 
far the world has come, and how far it still has to go, in removing the disarray in world 
agriculture. It quantifies the impacts both of past reforms and current policies by comparing 
the effects of the project’s distortion estimates for the period 1980-84 with those of 2004.  
Several key findings from that economy-wide modeling study are worth emphasizing. 
First, the policy reforms from the ealy-1980s to the mid-2000s improved global economic 
welfare by $233 billion per year, and removing the distortions remaining as of 2004 would 
add another $168 billion per year. This suggests that in a global welfare sense the world had 
moved three-fifths of the way towards global free trade in goods over that quarter century. 
Second, developing economies benefited proportionately more than high-income 
economies (1.0 percent compared with 0.7 percent of national income) from those past policy 
reforms, and would gain nearly twice as much as high-income countries by completing that 
reform process (an average increase of 0.9 percent compared with 0.5 percent for high-  17
income countries. Of those prospective welfare gains from global liberalization, 60 percent 
would come from agriculture and food policy reform – a striking result, given that the shares 
of agriculture and food in global GDP and global trade goods and services in 2006 were only 
3 and 6 percent, respectively. Even in developing countries agriculture now contributes less 
than 10 percent of GDP and exports on average (World Bank 2008). The contribution of farm 
and food policy reform to the prospective welfare gain for just developing countries is even 
greater, at 83 percent. 
Third, the share of global farm production exported (excluding intra-EU trade) in 
2004 was slightly smaller as a result of those reforms since 1980-84, because of less farm 
export subsidies. Agriculture’s 8 percent share in 2004 contrasts with the 31 percent share for 
other primary products and the 25 percent for all other goods – a ‘thinness’ that is an 
important contributor to the volatility of international prices for weather-dependent farm 
products. If the policies distorting goods trade in 2004 were removed, the share of global 
production of farm products that is exported would rise from 8 to 13 percent, thereby 
reducing instability of prices and quantities of those products traded. 
Fourth, the developing countries’ share of the world’s primary agricultural exports 
rose from 43 to 55 percent, and its farm output share from 58 to 62 percent, because of those 
reforms, with rises in nearly all agricultural industries except rice and sugar. Removing 
remaining goods market distortions would boost their export and output shares to 64 and 65 
percent, respectively. 
Fifth, the average real price in international markets for agricultural and food products 
would have been 13 percent lower had policies not changed over the past quarter century. 
Evidently the impact of the RRA fall in high-income countries (including the cuts in farm 
export subsidies) in raising international food prices more than offset the opposite impact of 
the RRA rise (including the cuts in agricultural export taxes) in developing countries over 
that period. By contrast, removing remaining distortions as of 2004 is projected to raise the 
international price of agricultural and food products by less than 1 percent on average. This is 
contrary to earlier modeling results based on the GTAP protections database (e.g. Anderson, 
Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006), which estimated they would rise by 3.1 percent, or 
for just primary agriculture, by 5.5 percent). The lesser impact in these new results is because 
export taxes in developing countries based on the above NRA estimates are included in the 
new database (most notably for Argentina) whose removal would offset the international 
price-raising effect of eliminating import protection and farm subsidies elsewhere.    18
Sixth, for developing countries as a group, net farm income (value added in 
agriculture) is estimated to be 4.9 percent higher than it would have been without the reforms 
of the past quarter century, which is more than ten times the proportional gain for non-
agriculture. If policies remaining in 2004 were removed, net farm incomes in developing 
countries would rise a further 5.6 percent, compared with just 1.9 percent for non-agricultural 
value added. As well, returns to unskilled workers in developing countries – the majority of 
whom work on farms – would rise more than returns to other productive factors from that 
liberalization. Together, these findings suggest both inequality and poverty could be 
alleviated by such reform, given that three-quarters of the world’s poor are farmers in 
developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2007).  
Finally, removal of agricultural price-supporting policies in high-income countries 
would undoubtedly lead to painful reductions in income and wealth for farmers there if they 
were not compensated – although it should be kept in mind that the majority of farm 
household income in high-income countries comes from off-farm sources (OECD 2008b). 
But the gainers in the rest of their societies could readily afford to compensate the losers from 
the benefits of freeing trade.  
 
Are policies stabilizing domestic prices? The case of rice 
 
Nowhere in Asia is the objective of stabilizing food prices and quantities more obvious than 
in rice, for which year-to-year fluctuations in trade barriers are frequently used as a buffer 
against domestic or international shocks, at the expense of using trade as a source of cheap 
imports or an opportunity for high export earnings. Since Asia produces and consumes four-
fifths of the world’s rice (compared with about one-third of the world’s wheat and maize), 
this market-insulating behavior of Asian policy makers means that even by 2000-04 only 6.9 
percent of global rice production was traded internationally
7 (compared with 14 and 24 
percent for maize and wheat), and so international prices are much more volatile for rice than 
for those other grains: its coefficient of variation over the 1970-2004 period was 0.63, 
compared with 0.46 and 0.44 for wheat and maize (Anderson and Associates 2009, Ch. 11). 
This in turn means that nominal rates of protection for rice would be above trend in years of 
low international prices and conversely in years when international prices for rice are high. 
                                                 
7 This was up from the pre-1990s half-decade global shares which are all less than 4.5 percent (e.g., 4.1 percent 
in 1985-89), and is greater than the Asian share of just 5.7 percent in 2000-04, according to Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008).   19
Figure 12 reveals that this indeed is the case. Even when averaging over all countries in 
Southeast or South Asia, the negative correlation between the rice NRAs and the international 
rice price is very high, at -0.59 for Southeast Asia and -0.75 for South Asia.  
 
Summary of pertinent findings 
 
The key findings of relevance to the question of Asia’s contributions to global economic 
development and stability via reform to policies affecting agricultural incentives include the 
following: 
•  Overall trade liberalization including cuts to import protection to manufacturing 
which has indirecty improved the competitiveness of the agricultural sector in many 
economies but especially in China and India, and brought the RRA close to zero. 
•  The gradual policy movement away from taxing agricultural exportables which, 
although it has been accompanied by a rise in agricultural import protection, has 
reduced somewhat the anti-trade bias in agricultural distortions, as indicated by the 
TBI and TRI moving toward zero over the past quarter-century. 
•  However, the dispersion across Asian economies in nominal and relative rates of 
assistance to farmers has increased rather than diminished despite the reforms in the 
region, as has the dispersion in farm product NRAs within each studied Asian 
economy, which means there is still lots of scope for reducing distortions in the 
region’s use of resources in agriculture though more international and intra-national 
re-location of production. Since openness tends to promote economic growth, total 
factor productivity growth in agriculture is slower than it would be if remaining 
price-distorting interventions were removed. As in other regions such as Latin 
America (Lopez and Gallinato 2006), there has been comparatively little assistance 
provided to Asian farmers via public investments in rural infrastructure and 
agricultural R&D
8 even though social rates of return from further such investments 
remain very high (Fan and Hazell 2001, Fan 2008). 
•  Food policies in Asia continue to seek to reduce fluctuations in domestic food prices 
and in the quantities available for consumption via fluctuations in barriers to trade, 
                                                 
8 Data in Pardey et al. (2006) suggest that public R&D expenditure in Asia since the late 1970s has averaged 
less than 0.5 percent of the gross value of production at undistorted prices, which is trivial compared with the 
NRA via price-distorting measures for Asia of 25 to 40 times that (12 percent in 2000-04 and below -20 percent 
prior to the mid-1980s).    20
especially for rice. This begger-thy-neighbor dimension of each economy’s food 
policy reduces the international public good role that trade between nations can play 
in bringing stability to the world’s food markets. The more some countries insulate 
their domestic markets, the more other countries perceive a need to do likewise,  
exacerbating the effect on world prices so that even larger changes in NRAs are 








After the current recession in high-income countries passes, Asia’s developing economies 
will keep growing rapidly, and the growth there will be more rapid in manufacturing and 
service activities than in agriculture. In the more densely populated economies of the region 
that growth will be accompanied by rapid increases in per capita incomes of low-skilled 
workers where labor-intensive exports boom. Agricultural comparative advantage is thus 
likely to decline in such economies. Whether these economies become more dependent on 
imports of farm products depends, however, on what happens to their RRAs. The first wave 
of Asian industrializers (Japan, and then Korea and Taiwan) chose to slow the growth of food 
import dependence by raising their NRA for agriculture even as they were bringing down 
their NRA for non-farm tradables, such that their RRA became increasingly above the neutral 
zero level. A key question is: will later industrializers follow suit, given the past close 
association of RRAs with rising per capita income and falling agricultural comparative 
advantage? 
  When the RRAs for Japan, Korea and Taiwan are mapped against real per capita 
income, it is possible to superimpose on that same graph the RRAs for lower-income 
economies to see how they are tracking relative to the first industrializers. Figure 13 does that 
for China and India, and shows that their RRA trends of the past three decades are on the 
same upward trajectory as the richer Northeast Asians. That provides reason to expect the 
                                                 
9 That policies seeking to insulate domestic food markets from changes in world market prices can be self-
defeating because of international spillovers was illustrated in 2007-08. The imposition of export restrictions in 
key exporting countries in late 2007 and early 2008 certainly contributed to the sharp increases in world prices 
in te first half of 2008: such measures simply increase the volatility of world markets as they seek to reduce 
volatility domestically.    21
governments of later industrializing economies to follow suit if other things were equal. 
However, numerous events qualify that expectation. 
One reason one might expect different government behavior now is because the 
earlier industrializers were not bound under GATT to keep down their agricultural protection. 
Had there been strict discipline on farm trade measures at the time Japan and Korea joined 
GATT in 1955 and 1967, respectively, their NRAs may have been halted at less than 20 
percent (Figure 14). At the time of China’s accession to WTO in December 2001, its NRA 
was less than 5 percent, or 7.3 percent for just import-competing agriculture. Its average 
bound import tariff commitment was about twice that (16 percent in 2005), but what matters 
most is China’s out-of-quota bindings on the items whose imports are restricted by tariff rate 
quotas. The latter tariff bindings as of 2005 were 65 percent for grains, 50 percent for sugar 
and 40 percent for cotton (WTO, ITC and UNCTAD 2007, p. 60). China also has bindings on 
farm product-specific domestic supports of 8.5 percent, and can provide another 8.5 percent 
as non-product specific assistance if it so wishes – a total 17 percent NRA from domestic 
support measures alone, in addition to what is available through out-of-quota tariff protection.  
Clearly the legal commitments China made on acceding to WTO are a long way from 
current levels of domestic and border support for its farmers, and so are unlikely to constrain 
the government very much in the next decade or so;
10 and the legal constraints on Asia’s 
developing countries that joined the WTO earlier (except for Korea) are even less 
constraining. For India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, for example, their estimated NRAs for 
agricultural importables in 2000-04 are 34, 4 and 6 percent, respectively, whereas the average 
bound tariffs on their agricultural imports are 114, 96 and 189 percent, respectively (WTO, 
ITC and UNCTAD 2007). Also, like other developing countries, they have high bindings on 
product-specific domestic supports of 10 percent and another 10 percent for non-product 
specific assistance, a total of 20 more percentage points of NRA that legally could come from 
domestic support measures – compared with currently less than 15 percent in South Asia 
(Table 3). 
One can only hope that the China and South and Southeast Asia will not make use of 
the legal wiggle room they have allowed themselves in their WTO bindings and thereby 
follow Japan, Korea and Taiwan into high agricultural protection and insulation. The 
indications in the on-going Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO are not 
encouraging. The Group of 33 developing countries, led by Indonesia but strongly supported 
                                                 
10 For more on this point, see Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2009).   22
by India and the Philippines, among others, is arguing for additional ‘special and differential 
treatment’ for developing countries in the form of exemptions from agricultural tariff cuts for 
so-called ‘special products’, and for a special safeguard mechanism that would allow such 
countries to impose even higher than bound tariffs in years of likely import surges. A much 
more efficient and equitable strategy would be to instead treat agriculture in the same way 
they have been treating non-farm tradable sectors. That would involve opening the sector to 
international competition, and relying on more-efficient domestic taxes (e.g., income and 
consumption or value-added taxes) rather than trade taxes for raising government revenue 
and on general social safety nets rather than variable trade taxes to cope with food price 
fluctuations.  
It might be argued that such a laissez faire strategy could increase rural-urban 
inequality and poverty and thereby generate social unrest. On the other hand, import policies 
that lead to high prices for staple foods, in particular, involve potentially serious risks for the 
urban and rural poor who are net buyers of food in developing countries. Available evidence 
suggests that problems of rural-urban poverty gaps have been alleviated in parts of Asia by 
some of the more-mobile members of farm households finding full- or part-time work off the 
farm and repatriating part of their higher earnings back to those remaining in farm households 
(Otsuka and Yamano 2006, World Bank 2007). Concerted government intervention through 
social policy measures are hugely important both in reducing the gaps between rural and 
urban incomes, identified by Hayami (2007) as a concern, and in raising national incomes 
overall (Winters, McCulloch and McKay 2004). Efficient ways of assisting any left-behind 
groups of poor (nonfarm as well as farm) households include public investment measures that 
have high social payoffs such as in basic education and health and in rural infrastructure, as 
well as in agricultural research and development.
11 
  Improvements in farm productivity that increase output while lowering consumer 
prices are likely to be much more important for long-run food security than import 
restrictions: both increase farmers’ incomes, but productivity growth lowers—rather than 
raises—food costs to consumers. Moreover, what were already high social benefits from 
                                                 
11 Even if just one-twentieth of the current NRA provided to Asian farmers via farm price-support policies was 
replaced by agricultural R&D expenditure, that would more than double current public spending on such R&D – 
and the latter would increase regional economic welfare whereas price-distortionary policies reduce it. Such a 
boost to Asian R&D could well be able to generate another green revolution of the order of magnitude of the 
first one that began in the 1960s, especially if it took full advantage of the new developments in biotechnology 
(as shown for rice, for example, in Anderson, Jackson and Nielsen 2005).    23
expanding investments in agricultural R&D have become even higher in recent years, thanks 
to the threat of climate change. In many regions agriculture will have to contend with hotter, 
drier and more volatile weather and hence also with scarcer water supplies (PECC 2008). 
New technologies to help farmers adapt to these changing conditions will be needed even 
sooner than they can be produced even if R&D investments increase immediately, given the 
very long lags from research start to farmer adoption. As well, the expected greater volatility 
in seasonal conditions due to climate change add to the above reasons for governments to 
agree to reduce their use of trade measures to insulate their domestic markets from 
fluctuations in international food market. 
In the light of the above, how should developing country policymakers deal with a 
sharp upward movement in international food prices? In 2008 as in the past, many 
governments have simply either increased their export restrictions or lowered their import 
restrictions on food staples for the duration of the spike (Figure 12). But what if this recent 
rise in international prices is much more prolonged than the short-lived spikes of recent 
decades? This year’s outlook projections by international agencies suggest prices could 
remain higher for the foreseeable future than in recent decades, and that growth in net food 
imports by rapidly industrializing economies of Asia is one of the significant contributors.
12 
Yet as we saw in Figure 7 and Table 1 above, China and India over the past two or more 
decades have steadily raised their RRAs which had been sufficient to keep both countries 
very close to self sufficient in primary agricultural products over the previous four decades. 
In terms of all agricultural and processed food trade though, in 2000-04 China for the first 
time became a net importer while, in South Asia, India’s net exports were less than Pakistan 
and Bangladesh’s net imports of farm products for the first time since the latter 1960s 
(Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson 2007).
13 Should these countries choose to keep their 
RRAs at current (close to zero) levels, their import dependence in agriculture could well 
increase over time. If so, other developing countries might well re-consider their current 
position in the WTO’s Doha round of trade negotiations: by agreeing to lower substantially 
their bound tariffs and subsidies on agricultural products, they could extract greater 
‘concessions’ from high-income countries without having to reduce their actual applied rates 
for the foreseeable future. If a successful Doha agreement was then concluded, that in turn 
                                                 
12 The World Bank’s commodity forecast as of May 2008 for grain prices is that by 2020 in real terms they will 
still be 10 percent above 2006 levels, which in turn were 20 percent above the average for 2001-05. IFPRI 
(2007) and the OECD and FAO (2008) similarly projected food prices to remain high well into next decade and 
beyond.  
13 This change for China was largely due to increases in imports of cotton needed to supply China’s surging 
production of textiles and clothing for export.   24
would reduce tariff binding overhangs and hence the scope to vary taxes on farm trade, thus 
boosting agricultural trade, ‘thickening’ international markets for farm products, and
food price instability. If Asia wished to take a lead in this direction, there would be no better 
product to first focus on
 reducing 
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Table 1: Export orientation, import dependence and self-sufficiency in primary agricultural 
production, major regions of the world,
a 1961 to 2004 
 
(percent at undistorted prices) 
 
 (a) Exports as share of production 
 
  1961-64 1970-74 1980-84 1990-94 2000-04 
Africa  19 17 12  7  8 
Asia  5 4 4 6 5 
Latin  America  24 27 16 16 27 
Western  Europe  13 16 27 37 43 
United  States  and  Canada  14 14 20 20 21 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  41 35 44 43 48 
Japan  1 2 1 0 1 
All  countries  11 11 13 16 16 
     Developing countries  8  8  7  8  8 
     High-income countries  14  15  22  26  29 
 
(b) Imports as share of apparent consumption 
 
  1961-64 1970-74 1980-84 1990-94 2000-04 
Africa  2 2 5 4 4 
Asia  4 4 8  16  14 
Latin  America  2 4 7  10  17 
Western  Europe  32 28 34 41 46 
United States and Canada  4  4  5  9  12 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  3 2 3 5 6 
Japan  23 24 24 26 27 
All  countries  11 10 12 19 18 
     Developing countries  3  4  8  14  13 
     High-income countries  18  16  20  25  27 
 
 (c) Self-sufficiency ratio 
 
  1961-64 1970-74 1980-84 1990-94 2000-04 
Africa  120 117 107 104 105 
Asia  102  100 96 89 91 
    China  99  100  98  101  98 
    India  98  99  99  100  100 
Latin  America  129 132 110 107 114 
Western  Europe  78 85 90 94 94 
United  States  and  Canada  111 112 119 114 111 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  165 151 174 170 183 
Japan  78 78 77 74 74 
All  countries  100 101 101  96  98 
     Developing countries  105  104  99  93  95 
     High-income countries  96  98  103  101  102 
 
Source: Anderson (2009, Ch. 1) using estimates of total agricultural production valued at 
undistorted prices and the FAO’s total agricultural trade value data 
 
a Includes intra-EU (and intra-NAFTA) trade.    30
Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture,
a Asian focus economies, 1955 to 2004
c 
(percent)  
   1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
       Japan  38.8 45.8 50.4 46.9 65.9 68.3  116.6  115.8  118.6  119.8 
Northeast Asia  -42.8 -42.6 -41.7 -41.2 -39.5 -38.2 -25.7  -1.7  14.4  11.9 
Korea  -3.2  4.0 13.4 35.7 56.3 89.4  126.1  152.8  129.8  137.3 
Taiwan  -12.0  3.6  3.0  9.3  7.1 14.9 27.1 38.1 46.4 61.3 
China
b  -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -35.5 -14.3  6.6  5.9 
Southeast  Asia  na -6.8  5.9 -8.8  0.0  4.6 -0.4 -4.2  0.0 11.1 
Indonesia  na  na  na -2.6  9.3  9.2 -1.7 -6.6 -8.6 12.0 
Malaysia  na -7.2 -7.5 -9.0  -13.0 -4.6  1.3  2.3 -0.2  1.2 
Philippines  na -5.3 14.4 -5.1 -7.1 -1.0 18.7 18.5 32.9 22.0 
Thailand  na  na  na  -20.3  -14.0 -2.0 -6.2 -5.7  1.7 -0.2 
Vietnam  na na na na na na  -13.9  -25.4  0.6  21.2 
South  Asia  0.0  -0.5 0.6 0.4  -5.5 0.6  20.9 0.7 0.2  13.6 
Bangladesh  na  na  na  -16.0  1.4 -3.3 11.7 -1.5 -5.2  2.7 
India
b  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2  -5.6 1.9  24.9 1.8 0.7  15.8 
Pakistan  na -0.7 15.3  6.8 -8.5 -6.4 -4.0 -6.9 -1.6  1.2 
Sri  Lanka  -2.3 -22.8 -24.5 -16.3 -25.5 -13.5  -9.9  -1.2  12.2  9.5 
Asian dev 
economies
a   -27.3 -26.7 -25.1 -25.3 -23.8 -20.6  -9.0  -2.0  7.5  12.0 
Av. dispersion
c  39 37 56 42 48 51 67 56 56 64 
 
a Weighted average includes product-specific input distortions and non-product specific 
assistance as well as authors’ guesstimates for non-covered farm products, with weights 
based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices. 
b Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 assume the nominal rates of assistance to 
agriculture in those years were the same as the average NRA estimates for those economies 
for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the gross value of production in those 
missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of production in total world 
production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. This set of assumptions is conservative in 
the sense that for both countries the average NRA was probably even lower (more negative) 
in earlier years. 
e Simple average across countries of the standard deviation of product NRAs around the weighted 
mean for each country each year. 
f Weighted average share of gross value of total agricultural production at undistorted prices 
accounted for by covered products. 
 
Source: Calculated from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), which draws on national estimates 
reported in Anderson and Martin (2008).   31
Table 3: Relative rates of assistance (RRA) to agriculture,
a Asian focus economies, 1955 to 
2004 
(percent)  
  1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
          J a p a n             
NRA  Ag.  37.2 44.5 50.4 47.3 70.8  67.0 127.7 129.7 133.4 133.6 
NRA  Non-Ag.  2.5 3.9 3.8 2.8 1.6 1.1 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.7 
RRA  33.9 39.1 44.9 43.3 68.1  65.2 124.8 127.1 131.4 132.1 
    Northeast Asia             
NRA  Ag.  -43.1 -42.5 -42.2 -41.3 -40.0  -18.4  -26.2 -1.7 14.7 12.0 
NRA  Non-Ag.  40.9 40.8 40.0 39.7 39.4 71.1 18.8 15.0  6.8  3.3 
RRA  -58.2 -57.7 -56.6 -55.7 -53.7 -51.9 -38.0 -14.2  7.4  8.5 
        K o r e a             
NRA Ag.  -3.3  4.9  16.3  46.1  71.8 118.6 159.8 197.6 164.8 171.9 
NRA  Non-Ag.  45.6 37.1 22.3 11.4  11.7 6.8 5.7 3.3 2.3 1.7 
RRA -32.6  -21.4  -4.8  30.5  53.9 104.8 145.9 188.2 158.8 167.3 
    Taiwan 
b             
NRA Ag.  -15.8  4.7  3.9  12.0  8.9 18.7 33.8 46.3 54.9 70.9 
NRA  Non-Ag.  8.8 9.3 8.8 7.5 7.0 5.2 4.5 2.6 1.8 1.0 
RRA  -22.5 -4.2 -4.5  4.2  1.7 12.9 28.0 42.5 52.2 69.0 
    China
 b             
NRA  Ag.  -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -45.2 -35.5 -14.3  6.6  5.9 
NRA  Non-Ag.  41.6 41.6 41.6 41.6 41.6 41.6 28.3 24.9  9.9  5.0 
RRA  -60.5 -60.5 -60.5 -60.5 -60.5 -60.5 -49.9 -31.1  -3.0  0.9 
    Southeast Asia             
NRA  Ag.  na  -5.8 5.6  -10.2 0.1 4.9  -0.9  -4.7 0.0  12.1 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na 11.5 15.4 20.2 22.0 21.1 18.0 11.5  8.2  8.1 
RRA  na -15.5  -8.5 -25.3 -18.0 -13.4 -16.1 -14.5  -7.7  3.7 
    Indonesia              
NRA  Ag.  na  na  na -3.8 10.4 10.5 -1.9 -7.5 -9.7 13.9 
NRA Non-Ag.  na  na  na  27.7 27.7 27.7 26.5 17.6 10.6  8.1 
RRA na  na  na  -24.7  -13.6  -13.5 -22.5 -21.3 -18.3  5.4 
    Malaysia             
NRA  Ag.  na -7.6 -7.9 -9.4  -13.7 -4.9  1.4  2.6 -0.2  1.5 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na 7.4 7.0 7.1 6.5 5.2 3.9 2.8 2.0 0.9 
RRA  na -14.0 -13.9 -15.5 -18.9  -9.6  -2.4  -0.3  -2.2  0.6 
    Philippines             
NRA  Ag.  na -1.7 14.3 -6.0 -7.2 -4.0 15.8 16.7 35.7 23.5 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na 19.0 20.3 16.3 16.3 12.9 11.0  9.9  8.6  6.4 
RRA  na -17.4  -5.0 -19.8 -20.3  -14.9  4.3  6.1 24.9 15.9 
    Thailand             
NRA  Ag.  na  na  na  -23.1  -15.9 -2.3 -6.9 -6.4  1.8 -0.2 
NRA Non-Ag.  na  na  na  16.1 16.0 14.2 11.1 10.0  8.9  7.8 
RRA  na  na  na -33.7 -27.5 -14.4 -16.3 -14.9  -6.5  -7.4 
    Vietnam 
b             
NRA  Ag.  na na na na na na  -15.9  -26.4  0.0  20.7 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na na na na na  na 4.3  -11.2 1.5  20.8 
RRA  na na na na na na  -19.2  -17.4  -1.3  0.0 
   South Asia            
NRA  Ag.  4.7 3.9 4.4 9.7  -7.7 1.8  47.1 0.2  -2.4  12.7 
NRA Non-Ag.  112.7  115.5  143.1  81.7 57.8 54.6 39.9 18.6 15.0 10.1 
RRA  -56.2 -56.8 -57.0 -39.8 -41.6 -33.3  5.1 -15.5 -14.9  3.4 
    Bangladesh             
NRA  Ag.  na na na na  3.1  -3.9  17.5  -2.4  -8.0  4.0 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na na na na 28.4 22.4 28.5 33.3 29.0 23.4 
RRA  na  na  na  na -19.7 -21.5  -8.6 -26.7 -28.6 -15.8 
    India 
b             
NRA  Ag.  5.2 5.2 5.2  12.6  -7.4 4.1  67.5 2.0  -2.3  15.4 
NRA Non-Ag.  113.0  113.0  113.0  83.1 64.8 59.3 48.6 15.9 12.6  5.2 
RRA  -56.3 -56.3 -56.3 -38.3 -43.8 -33.5  11.7 -12.1 -12.9  12.5 
    Pakistan 
b             
NRA  Ag.  na -1.0 21.7  9.3  -11.8 -9.3 -5.9  -10.2 -2.6  1.5 
NRA  Non-Ag.  na 169.7 224.5 146.7 44.0 48.3 45.1 39.3 27.0 14.6 
RRA  na -63.8 -62.4 -55.9 -38.6 -38.6 -35.1 -35.2 -23.0 -11.5   32
Table 3 (continued): Relative rates of assistance (RRA) to agriculture
a, Asian focus economies, 
1955 to 2004 
  1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
    Sri Lanka 
NRA  Ag.  -2.7 -25.7 -27.6 -18.5 -29.0 -15.4 -11.2  -1.3  14.0  10.8 
NRA Non-Ag.  104.9  124.6  138.4  70.7 52.9 57.1 59.0 47.1 36.4 22.9 
RRA  -52.5 -66.6 -68.0 -51.6 -53.5 -46.2 -44.3 -32.9 -16.3  -9.8 
    Asian dev. economies
c  
NRA  Ag.  -29.0 -27.7 -26.9 -24.3 -31.3 -18.8 -11.2  -2.6  7.5  11.7 
NRA  Non-Ag.  66.8 67.1 70.9 50.3 50.3 38.3 15.4 14.9  9.6  4.3 
RRA  -57.5 -56.4 -55.3 -47.9 -44.7 -40.8 -22.8 -15.2  -1.9  7.1 
Dispersion of 
national RRAs
d  21.9 30.7 36.2 37.6 41.5 51.9 56.0 65.1 50.5 50.8 
 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
b Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the 
nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in those years was the same as the average NRA 
estimates for those economies for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the gross value 
of production in those missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of 
production in total world production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. This NRA 
assumption is conservative in the sense that for both countries the average NRA was probably 
even lower in earlier years, according to the authors of those country case studies. 
c Weighted averages of the above national averages, using weights based on gross value of 
national agricultural production at undistorted prices. 
d Simple average of the standard deviation around a weighted mean of the national RRAs for 
the region each year. 
 
Source: Calculated from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), which draws on national estimates 
reported in Anderson and Martin (2008).   33
Table 4: Relationships between nominal rates of assistance to farm products and some of its 




variables:  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
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0.03* 
(-0.01)          
-0.07* 






b       
0.11* 
(-0.03)          
-0.13 
(-0.09)          
-0.03 


























              
R
2  0.10 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.07 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.14 0.28 0.29 0.29 
No.  of  obs. 2766 2766 2594 2594 2766 2766 2594 2594 2766 2766 2594 2594 
Country 
fixed effects  No No No No  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed 
effects  No No No No No No No  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
a Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food in 
national exports as a ratio of that sector’s share of global exports (world=1). 
 
b Net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and processed food 
products (world=1). 
 
Notes: Dependent variable for regressions is NRA by commodity and year. Results are OLS 
estimates, with standard errors in parentheses and significance levels shown at the 99%(*). 
The main explanatory variable is ln GDP per capita in $10,000s.  
 
Source: Anderson and Martin (2008, Ch. 1)   34
Table 5: Welfare Reduction Indexes, Asian, African, Latin American, Europe’s transition economies and high-income regions
a, all covered 
tradable farm products, 1960 to 2007         
(percent) 
  1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Import-competing products            
Africa  59 52 53 47 51 98 43 32 30 na 
Asia  36 45 46 50 48 62 48 44 48 na 
Latin  America  54 34 27 37 47 40 46 26 32 na 
All  developing  countries  49 46 43 44 44 54 36 28 30 na 
Europe’s  transition  economies  na na na na na na 60 44 45 43 
High-income  countries  79  87  71 100 106 123 102  91  87  50 
World  74 76 65 85 81  100 78 65 65 45 
Exportable products             
Africa  37 44 48 49 48 55 58 41 40 na 
Asia  24 43 34 34 48 45 24 10  7 na 
Latin  America  28 22 36 32 36 33 29 12 15 na 
All  developing  countries  31 38 38 36 46 44 26 11 10 na 
Europe’s  transition  economies  na na na na na na 37 33 31 42 
High-income  countries  12 20 16 12 12 25 22 11 11 10 
World  16 27 26 24 34 39 26 13 12 15 
All covered farm tradables
             
Africa  52 52 52 49 51 82 52 37 36 na 
Asia  27 43 39 42 47 45 28 19 16 na 
Latin  America  43 25 38 36 44 39 42 20 22 na 
All  developing  countries  44 44 42 42 47 47 31 19 18 na 
Europe’s  transition  economies  na na na na na na 47 40 40 44 
High-income  countries  49 48 46 64 69 70 51 38 37 22 
World  48 47 45 55 57 57 41 28 27 23 
Source: Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009), based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a.  Regional aggregates are weighted using the average of the value of production and the value of consumption at undistorted prices.    35
Table 6: Trade Reduction Indexes, Asian, African, Latin American, Europe’s transition economies and high-income regions
a, all covered 
tradable farm products, 1960 to 2007 
(percent) 
  1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Import-competing products            
Africa  -28  -23  -19 3 0  112 7  10 4  na 
Asia  11 25 19 26 38 70 68 63 76 na 
Latin  America  28 27 11  2  6  1 32 11 20 na 
All  developing  countries  -1 20 10 11  7 48 26 10 16 na 
Europe’s  transition  economies  na na na na na na 13 23 26 29 
High-income  countries  79 80 52 72 88 89 83 84 81 63 
World  64 55 42 56 58 80 59 60 62 56 
Exportable products              
Africa  29 39 43 47 41 36 38 24 30 na 
Asia  14 27 26 23 35 20 17  8  0 na 
Latin  America  20 15 28 22 23 21  5  2  3 na 
All  developing  countries  22 29 32 30 34 25 17  9  6 na 
Europe’s  transition  economies  na na na na na na  0  2 -2 -9 
High-income  countries  -8  -12 -9 -5 -8  -21  -13 -4 -2 -2 
World  3 7  11  12  17 8 4 4 3  -8 
All covered farm tradables              
Africa  32 33 33 34 18 54 17 16 23 na 
Asia  15 28 23 28 34 28 18  8  6 na 
Latin  America  22  8 19 17 19 13 23  7  8 na 
All  developing  countries  26 28 26 28 28 29 22  9 10 na 
Europe’s  transition  economies  na na na na na na -4 13 14  2 
High-income  countries  19  9 16 21 27 30 28 18 18  7 
World  21 17 20 24 28 30 21 14 14  2 
Source: Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009), based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a. Regional aggregates are weighted using the absolute value of net imports (computed as the difference between the value of consumption and 
the value of production) at undistorted prices.     36
Figure 1: Nominal international market prices for wheat, rice and maize, 1988 to mid-2008 
 













































Source: www.worldbank.org/prospects, September 2008 ‘Pink Sheets’  37
Figure 2: Nominal international market prices for crude oil and urea fertilizer, October 2003 






Source: www.worldbank.org/prospects, December 2008 ‘Pink Sheets’   38
Figure 3: Real international food price index, 1948 to 2008 
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Source: Author’s compilation using data from Pfaffenzeller, Newbolt and Rayner (2007), 
updated from 2004 with data from www.worldbank.org/prospects   39
Figure 4: Real international price index, food, energy, minerals and metals, and other primary products, 1920 to 2007 
 




























































































Figure 4 (continued): Real international price index, food, energy, minerals and metals, and other primary products, 1920 to 2007 
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Figure 5: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all
a agricultural 
products, Asian developing economies,
b 1955 to 2004 
 








1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
import-competing exportables total
 
      
a The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and importable averages because 
assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance is also included. 
 
b The exportables, import-competing and total estimates are based on China pre-1981 and 
India pre-1965 values estimated on the assumption that the nominal rate of assistance to 
agriculture in those years was the same as the average NRA estimates for those economies 
for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the gross value of production in those 
missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of production in total world 
production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
 
Source: Calculated from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), which draws on national estimates 
reported in Anderson and Martin (2008).   42
Figure 6: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable products 
and relative rate of assistance,
a Asia developing economies,
b 1955 to 2004 
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t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
b The exportables, import-competing and total estimates are based on China pre-1981 and 
India pre-1965 values estimated on the assumption that the nominal rate of assistance to 
agriculture in those years was the same as the average NRA estimates for those economies 
for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively, and that the gross value of production in those 
missing years is that which gives the same average share of value of production in total world 
production in 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
 
Source: Calculated from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), which draws on national estimates 
reported in Anderson and Martin (2008).   43
Figure 7: Nominal and relative rates of assistance, China and India, 1965 to 2005 
(percent) 
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Source:  Calculated from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), which draws on national estimates reported in Anderson and Martin (2008).  44
Figure 8: Nominal and relative rates of assistance,
a Asian, African and Latin American 










































a 5-year weighted averages with value of production at undistorted prices as weights.  
 
b Estimates for China pre-1981 and India pre-1965 are based on the assumption that the 
nominal rates of assistance to agriculture and national share or regional agricultural 
production in those years were the same as the average NRA estimates for those economies 
for 1981-84 and 1965-69, respectively. 
 
Source: Calculated from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), which draws on national estimates 
reported in Anderson and Masters (2009), Anderson and Martin (2009) and Anderson and 
Valdés (2008).   45
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Source: Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009), based on NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008).   46
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 Source: Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009), based on NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and 
Valenzuela (2008).   47
Figure 11: Nominal rate of assisnace and Welfare and Trade Reduction Indexes for covered 
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Source: Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009), calculations based on NRAs and CTEs in 
Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).   48
Figure 12: Rice NRA and international rice price, South and Southeast Asia, 1970 to 2005 
(left axis is int’l price in USD, right axis is NRA in percent) 
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Correlation coefficient is -0.59 
 
Source: Anderson and Martin (2009), based on data in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008)    49
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Source:  Calculated from Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), which draws on national estimates reported in Anderson and Martin (2008). 